Authentication
Pass user auth context from your frontend to the agent so it can scope tools, data, and decisions to the signed-in user.
"use client";// Auth demo — framework-native request authentication via the V2 runtime's// `onRequest` hook. The runtime route (/api/copilotkit-auth) rejects any// request whose `Authorization: Bearer <demo-token>` header is missing or// wrong.//// UX shape: the demo defaults to UNAUTHENTICATED on first paint so visitors// land on a clear sign-in card. We don't render `<CopilotKit>` until the user// has signed in at least once — that sidesteps the transport 401 that would// otherwise crash `<CopilotChat>` during its initial `/info` handshake.// After the user signs in once, `<CopilotKit>` stays mounted across the// sign-out → sign-in cycle so the post-sign-out state can actually// demonstrate the runtime rejecting unauthenticated requests in the chat// surface (the whole point of the demo).//// Error surfacing: the post-sign-out 401 is captured via the AGENT-SCOPED// `<CopilotChat onError>` channel, NOT the provider-level `<CopilotKit// onError>` alone. Agent-run errors (`agent_run_failed`) are reliably// delivered to the chat-scoped subscription, whereas the provider-level// handler does not fire for them in this flow — so a demo that relies only// on `<CopilotKit onError>` never renders the rejection banner. We register// the same handler on BOTH channels: `<CopilotKit onError>` covers any// provider-level errors (e.g. the initial `/info` handshake) and// `<CopilotChat onError>` covers agent-run rejections, which is what the// sign-out path produces.import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react";import { CopilotKit, CopilotChat } from "@copilotkit/react-core/v2";import type { CopilotKitCoreErrorCode } from "@copilotkit/react-core/v2";import { AuthBanner } from "./auth-banner";import { SignInCard } from "./sign-in-card";import { useDemoAuth } from "./use-demo-auth";import { DEMO_TOKEN } from "./demo-token";interface AuthDemoErrorState { message: string; code: CopilotKitCoreErrorCode | string;}interface AuthErrorEvent { error?: { message?: string } | null; code: CopilotKitCoreErrorCode;}export default function AuthDemoPage() { const { isAuthenticated, authorizationHeader, hasEverSignedIn, signIn, signOut, } = useDemoAuth(); const headers = useMemo<Record<string, string>>( () => (authorizationHeader ? { Authorization: authorizationHeader } : {}), [authorizationHeader], ); const [authError, setAuthError] = useState<AuthDemoErrorState | null>(null); // Shared error handler wired to BOTH the provider-level and chat-level // `onError` channels (see the file header for why both are needed). const handleAuthError = useCallback((event: AuthErrorEvent) => { setAuthError({ message: (event.error?.message && event.error.message.trim()) || (event.code ? `Request rejected (${event.code})` : "The request was rejected."), code: event.code, }); }, []); // Clear stale errors as soon as the user re-authenticates. This is the // ONLY thing that gates the amber error surface on auth state — the render // condition below keys off `authError` alone. Coupling the render to a // second `!isAuthenticated` slice (the obvious-but-wrong guard) created a // post-sign-out race: the rejection's `onError` fires and calls // `setAuthError`, but if that commit landed in a render where the auth // state hadn't yet settled to false, `authError && !isAuthenticated` // evaluated false and the banner never appeared. Driving the surface off // `authError` and clearing it here on re-auth removes the cross-slice // ordering dependency: a rejection always renders, and signing back in // always wipes it. useEffect(() => { if (isAuthenticated) setAuthError(null); }, [isAuthenticated]); if (!hasEverSignedIn) { return ( <div className="flex h-screen flex-col"> <SignInCard onSignIn={signIn} /> </div> ); } return ( // `useSingleEndpoint={false}` opts into the V2 multi-endpoint protocol // (separate /info, /agents/<id>/run, etc.), which is what this demo's // runtime route is wired up for. <CopilotKit runtimeUrl="/api/copilotkit-auth" agent="auth-demo" headers={headers} useSingleEndpoint={false} onError={handleAuthError} > <div className="flex h-screen flex-col gap-3 p-6"> <AuthBanner authenticated={isAuthenticated} onSignOut={signOut} onSignIn={() => signIn(DEMO_TOKEN)} /> <header> <h1 className="text-lg font-semibold">Authentication</h1> </header> {authError && ( <div data-testid="auth-demo-error" className="rounded-md border border-amber-300 bg-amber-50 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-amber-900" > <strong className="font-semibold"> Runtime rejected the request: </strong>{" "} <span data-testid="auth-demo-error-message"> {authError.message} </span>{" "} <code className="ml-1 rounded bg-amber-100 px-1 py-0.5 font-mono text-xs"> {authError.code} </code> </div> )} <div className="flex-1 overflow-hidden rounded-md border border-neutral-200"> <CopilotChat agentId="auth-demo" className="h-full" onError={handleAuthError} /> </div> </div> </CopilotKit> );}You have a chat surface or a hook driving an agent and you want every agent run to know who the request came from. By the end of this guide, your frontend will forward a token, the runtime will pass it through, and your agent code will read the resulting user info on every turn.
When to use this#
- Multi-tenant apps where the agent reads or writes per-user data.
- Tool gating where some tools should only run for authorised users.
- Audit and billing where every run needs an identity to attribute it to.
- Session-aware UX where the agent's behaviour depends on the user's role or permissions.
If you don't need any of those, skip auth entirely. The agent runs anonymously and the frontend never has to care about tokens.
Frontend#
Pass your token via the headers prop. CopilotKit attaches it to every runtime request, and the runtime forwards the Authorization header on to your agent — whether that's a LangGraph deployment or a self-hosted AG-UI endpoint.
import { CopilotKit } from "@copilotkit/react-core/v2";
<CopilotKit
runtimeUrl="/api/copilotkit"
headers={{
Authorization: `Bearer ${userToken}`,
}}
>
<YourApp />
</CopilotKit>`properties` is not an auth channel
Older versions of this guide passed the token as properties={{ authorization: userToken }}. The runtime delivers properties to the agent as AG-UI forwardedProps — run payload data, not a request header — so nothing turns them into a Bearer credential. Use headers for auth. Headers the server configured on the agent itself still win on collision, so a service-to-service token can't be overridden from the browser.
Backend#
LangGraph supports two deployment modes. The frontend code above is the same in both, but the backend wiring differs in where the resolved user identity lands. Pick the tab that matches where your agent runs.
On LangGraph Platform (and on langgraph dev), authentication is a managed service. You declare an @auth.authenticate handler, and the server runs it on every request before the graph starts. The forwarded Authorization header arrives as the handler's authorization argument, and the handler's return value becomes available to every node in the run.
from langgraph_sdk import Auth
auth = Auth()
@auth.authenticate
async def authenticate(authorization: str | None):
if not authorization or not authorization.startswith("Bearer "):
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
token = authorization.replace("Bearer ", "")
user_info = validate_your_token(token) # your validation logic
return {
"identity": user_info["user_id"],
"role": user_info.get("role"),
"permissions": user_info.get("permissions", []),
}The return value of the handler shows up in every node's config["configurable"]["langgraph_auth_user"]. From there, scoping tool access or filtering data is straightforward:
from langchain_core.runnables import RunnableConfig
async def my_agent_node(state: AgentState, config: RunnableConfig):
user_info = config["configurable"]["langgraph_auth_user"]
user_id = user_info["identity"]
user_role = user_info.get("role")
# agent logic with user context
return stateFor full handler details, see the LangGraph Platform Authentication documentation.
When you self-host the agent behind FastAPI, there's no managed auth handler to plug into — validation is your job, and the natural place for it is the endpoint that serves the AG-UI stream. add_langgraph_fastapi_endpoint mounts that endpoint for you, but it takes one pre-built agent and gives you no per-request hook, so replace it with the equivalent route of your own: a FastAPI dependency verifies the Authorization header the runtime forwarded, and the resolved user is baked into a per-request agent's config.
from typing import Optional
from ag_ui.core.types import RunAgentInput
from ag_ui.encoder import EventEncoder
from copilotkit import LangGraphAGUIAgent
from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Header, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse
from src.agent import graph
app = FastAPI()
def current_user(authorization: Optional[str] = Header(default=None)) -> dict:
if not authorization or not authorization.startswith("Bearer "):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing bearer token")
return validate_your_token(authorization.removeprefix("Bearer ").strip()) # your validation
@app.post("/")
async def run_agent(
input_data: RunAgentInput,
request: Request,
user: dict = Depends(current_user),
):
encoder = EventEncoder(accept=request.headers.get("accept"))
# One agent per request: the verified identity rides on this run only, and
# each request gets its own isolated streaming state.
agent = LangGraphAGUIAgent(
name="sample_agent",
graph=graph,
config={"configurable": {"auth_user": user}},
)
async def event_generator():
async for event in agent.run(input_data):
yield encoder.encode(event)
return StreamingResponse(event_generator(), media_type=encoder.get_content_type())Unauthenticated requests never reach the graph — they get a 401 from the dependency. Authenticated ones arrive with an already-verified user on the config, so nodes read identity instead of re-validating a raw token:
from langchain_core.runnables import RunnableConfig
async def my_agent_node(state: AgentState, config: RunnableConfig):
user = config["configurable"]["auth_user"]
user_id = user["user_id"]
user_role = user.get("role")
# agent logic with user context
return stateIf you only need the 401 gate
When nodes don't need the identity — you just want unauthenticated traffic rejected — keep add_langgraph_fastapi_endpoint and hang the dependency off the app: FastAPI(dependencies=[Depends(current_user)]). The gate applies, but nothing lands on the run config, so config["configurable"] stays empty of user context.
`CopilotKitRemoteEndpoint` no longer works here
Guides written for CopilotKit v1 wrapped the graph in CopilotKitRemoteEndpoint(agents=lambda context: [...]). That path is retired: copilotkit no longer exports LangGraphAgent (ImportError), and the current LangGraphAGUIAgent exposes run() rather than the execute() that CopilotKitRemoteEndpoint calls — giving AgentExecutionException: 'LangGraphAGUIAgent' object has no attribute 'execute'. Use the endpoint above instead.
Tool gating#
The most common reason to wire auth is so individual tools can decline to run. Read the resolved user inside the tool's handler and bail if the role doesn't match:
def delete_record(record_id: str, *, user: User):
if "admin" not in user.permissions:
raise PermissionError("admin role required")
# do the deleteThis composes with Human in the loop: gate on auth first, surface a confirmation card next, execute last.
Thread authorization#
Verifying who the caller is doesn't yet stop them reaching someone else's conversation. How much of that you have to build depends on which runtime you're running.
| Runtime | Who scopes threads to a user |
|---|---|
CopilotRuntime with intelligence | Mostly the runtime, via identifyUser — with three routes you still have to guard. |
| Anything else — SSE runtime, custom store, local in-memory runner | You do. See Scope threads yourself. |
The Intelligence Platform scopes most thread routes#
The Intelligence runtime requires an identifyUser callback — construction throws without one (or without at least one Channel). It runs on the server, once per request, and the id it returns is the scope the runtime hands to the platform. (intelligence below is a CopilotKitIntelligence instance; Connect your runtime to Intelligence covers building it.)
const runtime = new CopilotRuntime({
agents: { default: agent },
intelligence,
identifyUser: async (request) => {
const session = await verifyAppSession(request); // Your server-side auth.
if (!session?.user) throw new Error("Unauthorized"); // Backstop; see below.
return { id: session.user.id, name: session.user.name };
},
});`identifyUser` is not an authentication gate
Most routes resolve the caller through identifyUser, but not all of them do — and the
ones that don't never invoke your callback at all. Rejecting unauthenticated requests is
onRequest's job: it runs before routing, on every route, without exception. Treat
identifyUser as the thing that names an already-authenticated caller, never as the thing
that decides whether a caller gets in.
Where a route does resolve the caller, what matters next is whether that id is actually carried to the platform as a scope:
| Route | Scoped to the resolved user? |
|---|---|
agent/run, agent/connect | Yes |
threads/list | Yes — and filtered by agentId, so useThreads returns the caller's threads rather than the project's |
threads/messages | Yes |
threads/update (rename via PATCH, delete via DELETE), threads/archive | Yes |
| Thread subscription token | Yes |
threads/events, threads/state | No — resolves the caller, then ignores it |
agent/stop | No — never resolves a caller at all |
Three routes are not user-scoped
threads/events and threads/state back the inspector. Both resolve the
caller and then discard the result, reading the thread by id alone — the runtime calls the
platform's project-authenticated _inspect endpoints, which take no user parameter. Any
caller can read the full event log and current agent state of any thread in the project,
given its threadId.
agent/stop never resolves a caller. It goes straight to runner.stop({ threadId }),
which aborts whichever run the runtime is tracking under that thread id. Any caller who
learns an active threadId can kill that run mid-flight.
Guard all three yourself. The onBeforeHandler pattern below applies on the Intelligence
path too, narrowed to these routes:
onBeforeHandler: async ({ request, route }) => {
// Switch rather than an array `includes`, so `route` narrows and
// `route.threadId` type-checks — all three variants carry one.
switch (route.method) {
case "threads/events":
case "threads/state":
case "agent/stop":
break;
default:
return;
}
// None of these is scoped platform-side; check your own ownership record.
const user = await verifyRequest(request);
if (!(await userOwnsThread(user.id, route.threadId))) {
throw new Response("Not found", { status: 404 });
}
},Without an ownership record of your own, reject these routes outright rather than leaving them open.
For everything in the Yes rows there is no ownership table to build. What you own is identifyUser itself:
- Derive the id from a server-verified credential. The callback receives the raw
Request; whatever it returns is trusted from there on. Reading a user id straight out of a header or request body hands every caller the ability to name themselves. - Return a stable id. It is the key threads hang off. Change it — swapping an email for a subject claim, say — and that user's existing threads stop resolving.
- Send the
401fromonRequest. Beyond the status codes being wrong — anidentifyUserthat throws surfaces as a500, a malformed id as a400— routes likeagent/stopnever call it, so a check placed only here isn't reached on every request. Authenticate inonRequest, which runs on every route and can throw aResponsedirectly, and keep the throw insideidentifyUseras a backstop.
A static identifyUser value is suitable only for a single-user demo. In a multi-user
application every request must resolve the authenticated user, or those users share one
thread scope.
See Scope Rich Threads to the signed-in user for the full runtime contract.
Scope threads yourself#
Without the Intelligence Platform there is no server-side binding between a threadId and a user. A threadId is just an opaque id travelling in a request: if user A learns user B's, every thread route accepts it. The rest of this section is the pattern for a custom store, a plain SSE runtime, or the local in-memory runner — and it's also what you narrow to threads/events, threads/state, and agent/stop if you are on the platform.
Own the mapping
Whatever stores your threads, keep a record of who each one belongs to. The minimum is a table your runtime can query:
create table thread_owners (
thread_id text primary key,
user_id text not null
);
create index on thread_owners (user_id);Write a row when a conversation is first created — see minting a thread with your own API for where that hooks into the chat lifecycle.
Enforce it in onBeforeHandler
onRequest runs before routing, so it can't see which thread is being addressed. onBeforeHandler runs after, and receives a route that names the operation and — for thread-scoped routes — the threadId:
const handler = createCopilotRuntimeHandler({
runtime,
basePath: "/api/copilotkit",
hooks: {
onRequest: async ({ request }) => {
// Authenticate first: reject anonymous callers outright.
const user = await verifyRequest(request);
if (!user) throw new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });
},
onBeforeHandler: async ({ request, route }) => {
const user = await verifyRequest(request);
// Routes that name a thread directly.
if ("threadId" in route) {
if (!(await userOwnsThread(user.id, route.threadId))) {
throw new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
}
return;
}
// agent/run and agent/connect carry the thread in the body instead.
if (route.method === "agent/run" || route.method === "agent/connect") {
// Clone: the handler still needs to read the original body.
const { threadId } = await request.clone().json();
if (threadId && !(await userOwnsThread(user.id, threadId))) {
throw new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
}
}
},
},
});The routes that carry a threadId on route are agent/stop, threads/update, threads/archive, threads/messages, threads/events, and threads/state.
A thread id is not a secret
Treat threadId as a public identifier, like a database primary key in a URL. It travels
through the browser, appears in logs, and is trivially enumerable if you mint sequential
ids. Authorization has to be an explicit ownership check — never "they knew the id, so they
must own it". Minting UUIDs makes guessing impractical but is not itself a control.
Filter the thread list
threads/list has no threadId to check, so onBeforeHandler has nothing to authorize against. Off the platform the route returns whatever the configured store holds — the local in-memory runner filters by agentId only, and a custom store returns exactly what you wrote. Build the list from your own ownership table instead, and drive the chat with the selected id.
Filter server-side. Hiding rows in the UI leaves the underlying route open.
With no platform thread store, the ownership table above is your thread list. See Self-managed thread persistence.
Security checklist#
- Always validate the token on the backend. Never trust the frontend's claim.
- Scope every read and write to the resolved user. Auth context only matters if you actually use it to filter data.
- Authenticate in
onRequest. It is the only hook that runs on every route.identifyUsernames a caller; it does not gate one, and some routes never invoke it. - Bind threads to a user. On the Intelligence Platform that means a correct
identifyUser, plus your own guard onthreads/events,threads/state, andagent/stop; off it, an ownership check on every thread route rather than only at login. See Thread authorization. - Don't log raw tokens. Log the resolved user id (or
anonymous) instead. - Use HTTPS in production. The Bearer token is sensitive.
- Refresh strategy. Your frontend is responsible for rotating expired tokens before they reach the agent. CopilotKit doesn't refresh on your behalf.